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The law of equal employment opportunity is a rapidly expanding
field which is increasingly important to the legal practitioners of Wyoming. In this article, the author makes a comparative analysis of Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Wyoming Fair Employment
Practices Act of 1965. Ms. Lawson continues with a discussion of the
general body of case law which has developed in the area of employment discrimination and analyzes the principal cases which have been
decided in Wyoming. Included for the benefit of attorneys representing Wyoming clients are many practical suggestions useful in advising
employers on compliance with the Acts and representing employees in
making complaints under the Acts.

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN
WYOMING: A NEW LEGAL FRONTIER
Leslie M. Lawson*
Wyoming is experiencing the "gold rush" of the 1970's
as thousands of people move to Wyoming in search of
employment now offered by greatly increased development
of the state's natural resources. Along with this new workforce come new problems for Wyoming, among which are
equal employment problems. Attorneys in Wyoming will be
asked more frequently for advice and representation in matters of employment discrimination by individuals as well as
employers, employment agencies and labor unions. The attorney who is knowledgeable in this area of law may be able
to save the employer thousands of dollars with advice on
voluntary compliance or resolve an individual's problem
short of costly litigation.
Copyright@ 1977 by the University of Wyoming
*Staff Attorney, Clinical Education

Program, University of Denver, College
of Law; Previously, Trial Attorney, Denver Regional Litigation Center,
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; Served on Board of Directors,
Lawyers for Colorado's Women; B.A. 1969, University of Wyoming; J.D.
1972, University of Wyoming; admitted to Wyoming Bar, 1973, Colorado
Bar, 1974.
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A number of state and federal laws apply to equal employment matters. The two principal laws with which a
Wyoming attorney should be familiar are Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act' and the Wyoming Fair Employment
Practices Act of 1965 (FEPA).' Although an increasing
number of complaints and increased enforcement of the laws
in Wyoming are recent developments, employers were to have
complied long ago and may be liable today for both current
and previous non-compliance.
The need for equal employment opportunity is very real.
Rising inflation has made it necessary for both spouses to
work to afford basic necessities of a family. Racial and ethnic minorities have historically been denied equal employment opportunity, which has in turn deprived them of other
necessities such as adequate housing and good educations.
The problems of women and minorities are best illustrated
by statistics on white and non-white families. In 1973, more
than twenty-five percent of all black families and seventeen
percent of all families of Spanish origin were below the
poverty level, compared with less than seven percent of all
white families. About two-thirds of all black children, onehalf of all children of Spanish origin and two-fifths of all
white children living in poverty were in families headed by
women.' Federal statistics show, further, that the median
income of a white male head of household was $13,253 in
1973, while the median income for a white female head of
household was $6,560. The comparable figures for black
families were $9,549 and $4,226.' The figures illustrate the
economic disparities between whites and non-whites and between households headed by males and those headed by females. The combined discrimination against racial minorities and women has made it nearly impossible for a non-white
female to support a family.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1970),
Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§
2. WYo. STAT. §§ 27-257 to -264 (1967 &
3. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BuLL. No. 297,
(1975).
4. Id. at 142.
1.

as amended by Equal Employment
2000e-2000e-17 (Supp. V 1975).
Supp. 1975).
HANDBOOK0OF WOMEN WORKERS 143
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EQUAL EMPLOYMENT LAW GENERALLY

A number of laws provide for equal employment opportunity, and as remedies some may be used in combination
with one another or alternatively. The Wyoming FEPA prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of sex, race,
creed, color, national origin, or ancestry. It is administered
by the Wyoming Fair Employment Commission (FEC) which
is a part of the Wyoming Department of Labor and Statistics. Wyoming also has a law which specifically requires the
same pay for women as for men employed in the same work
by the same employer.'
Several federal laws prohibit, either directly or indirectly, discrimination in employment on the basis of race,
sex, national origin, color or religion. Title VII, which is
enforced by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), specifically prohibits discrimination on these
bases in all phases of employment.
The Equal Pay Act of 1963,6 which is administered by
the U.S. Department of Labor, prohibits sex discrimination
in the payment of wages for equal work on jobs performed
under similar conditions and requiring equal skill, effort and
responsibility.'
Any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance cannot exclude any person from participation in or
the benefits of the program or activity, or otherwise discriminate on the basis of race, sex, creed, color or national origin,
according to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.8 Title
IX of that Act 9 prohibits sex discrimination in some private
and public schools, which includes discrimination in employment.
5.

Wyo. STAT.

§ 27-210.2 (1967).

6. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1970), as amended by Fair Labor Standards Amendments
of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (Supp. V 1975).
7. See EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, Relationship of
Title VII to the Equal Pay Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.8 (1975).
8. Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970).
9. Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-83 (Supp. V. 1975).
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Three post-Civil War civil rights laws have also been
held applicable to employment. The Civil Rights Act of 1871"0
has been judicially interpreted to prohibit discrimination on
the basis of race, sex, and national origin, resulting from
state action, while the Civil Rights Act of 1866" has been interpreted to apply only in cases involving race or national
origin. A law derived from the Civil Rights Acts of 1871
prohibits conspiracy to interfere with civil rights and this,
also, has been used, when appropriate, in employment cases.12
Executive orders have been issued to remedy discrimination on the basis of race, sex, national origin, color or religion
by the federal government or a contractor with the federal
government, and provide for enforcement by the Secretary
of Labor. Executive Order No. 11,478 applies to federal employers and requires continuing affirmative action programs
in each agency,1" whereas Title VII provides for affirmative
action only as a remedy. Executive Order No. 11,246, as
amended in 1967, orders that provisions prohibiting such
discrimination by government contractors be included in
government contracts. 1"
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and the equivalent clause of the fifth amendment
apply to discrimination resulting from state or federal action. For example, pregnancy leave policies for public school
teachers15 and the treatment of disabilities related to pregnancy under a state social welfare program"6 have been litigated under the equal protection clause.
Employment discrimination cases arising in Wyoming
will most often involve the Wyoming FEPA or Title VII,
the latter being the most comprehensive and generally applicable of the federal laws. This article is a comparative
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1970).
13. 3 C.F.R. § 207 (1974).
14. 3 C.F.R. § 169 (1974), amending Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. § 684

(1967).
15. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
16. Geduldig v. Aeillo, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
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analysis of the two laws designed to illustrate the benefits
and burdens of each law, while providing a basic guide to
handling cases involving these laws.
COVERAGE OF TITLE VII AND THE WYOMING

FEPA

The first problem which arises in an employment discrimination case is the determination of which laws, if any,
cover the aggrieved party, the person allegedly discriminating, and the employment practice in question. The nature
of the enforcement agency and its powers are important
factors to consider in choosing the law which will best serve
the interests of the client. The attorney representing an employer, employment agency or labor union should determine,
prior to the time a claim of discrimination is filed against
his client, which laws affect the client and what action constitutes compliance with these laws. Non-compliance or the
failure to demonstrate efforts to comply are generally costly
in some form, even though the person claiming discrimination may not ultimately prevail.
Title VII
Title VII prohibits discrimination by employers of fifteen or more employees who are engaged in interstate commerce, employment agencies, labor organiations and joint
labor-management apprenticeship committees.' The definition of interstate commerce is now so broad that generally
the number of employees is the only qualifying factor.' Federal employers and federal contractors are also covered."0
Specifically excluded from coverage are Indian Tribes, bona
fide private clubs, and religious institutions."
Individuals protected by Title VII may be employees or
applicants for employment, union members or applicants
2
for membership, apprentice or apprenticeship applicants. '
A limited number of individuals are excluded from coverage,
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-2 (Supp. V 1975).
E.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-16 to -17 (Supp. V 1975).
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), 2000e-1 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
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such as elected officials, their policy-level employees and legal
advisers. 2 The United States Supreme Court has recently
held that protection from racial discrimination under Title
VII applies to whites as well as non-whites, contrary to previous lower court decisions.2
In addition to the general prohibition against employment discrimination, Title VII specifically prohibits discharge, classification, failure or refusal to hire or referral for
employment based upon discriminatory policies. 4 Job advertisements indicating a preference which discriminates on
the basis of race, sex, national origin, color, or creed are prohibited unless the preference is based upon a "bona fide occupational qualification."" Unlike other laws, Title VII wisely
prohibits retaliation against employees who have filed a
charge, opposed an unlawful practice or assisted in the processing of a complaint. 6
The 1964 Civil Rights Act created the EEOC to investigate and attempt to conciliate charges, and provided that
suits for enforcement were to be filed by the United States
Attorney General. In 1972 the Act was amended to enable
the EEOC to bring civil actions against private employers
as part of the enforcement effort.2 7 In addition, the 1972
amendment granted the Attorney General authority to bring
civil actions against political subdivisions which were included under Title VII by the amendment. 8 Individuals who have
filed charges may also bring suit or intervene in suits filed
by the EEOC or the Justice Department. The right of an
individual to enforce Title VII has been interpreted as separate from the right of the federal agencies.2
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

20 0
0e- 2 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(f),
McDonald v. Santa Fe Transp. Co., 423 U.S. 923 (1976).
42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-2 (1q70 & Supp. V 1975).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). Bona fide occupational
qualifications are discussed under "Defenses," infra.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (Supp. V 1975).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1) (Supp. V 1975).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1) (Supp. V 1975).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1) (Supp. V 1975); Williamson v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 468 F.2d 1201 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1972); United
States v. Operating Engineers Local 3, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1088 (N.D.
Cal. 1972); EEOC v. Cleveland Mills Co., 502 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1974),

cert. denied, 420 U.S. 946 (1975).
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Wyoming FEPA
The Wyoming FEPA prohibits discrimination by the
State of Wyoming or any political subdivision or board,
commission, department, institution or school district thereof,
and every employer of two or more persons.3 ° Religious institutions or associations are the only employers specifically
exempted from coverage." Individuals specifically protected
by the FEPA are employes, applicants for employment, union
members and applicants for union membership. 2 No persons
are specifically excluded from protection.
The FEPA defines discriminatory or unfair employment
practices as refusal to hire, discharge, promotion or demotion, discrimination in matters of compensation by an employer, or discrimination in employment or membership by
any person, employment agency, labor organization, or the
employees or members thereof, on the basis of race, sex,
creed, color, national origin or ancestry. 3 The FEPA does
not specify that discriminatory employment advertisements
constitute an unlawful employment practice. However, the
FEC adopted a resolution which states that the publication
of an employment advertisement which expresses or indicates
any limitation, preference, specification or discrimination
based on race, color, religion, national origin or sex is in
violation of the FEPA 4 An important omission is the failure
to prohibit retaliation against employees who have opposed
unlawful practices.
The FEC consists of the Commissioner of Labor and
Statistics and four other members to be appointed by the
Governor with the advice of the Senate for terms of five
years, no more than two of which may be from the same
political party." The members serve without compensation."'
The FEC has the power to issue cease-and-desist orders,
30. WYO. STAT. § 27-258(2)

31.
32.
33.
34.

(1967).

WYO. STAT. § 27-258(2) (1967).
WYo. STAT. § 2.7-261 (1967).
WYO. STAT. § 27-261 (1967).
Resolution of Fair Employment Practices with Relation to Discriminatory
Employment Advertisements, [1976] 3 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) Para.
29,335.

35. Wyo. STAT. § 27-259 (Supp. 1975).

36. Wyo. STAT. § 27-259 (Supp. 1975).
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regulations, and subpoenas, and the duty to investigate and
hold hearings on complaints. 7 The FEPA provides for enforcement only by the FEC, as opposed to granting the complainant an independent right to file a suit or otherwise
enforce the law.
COMPLAINT AND CONCILIATION PROCEDURES

Title VII
Condition precedent to the filing of a Title VII suit is
the filing of a charge of employment discrimination within
specified time periods. A Wyoming resident files with the
EEOC District Office in Denver, Colorado, and may do so
by mail.." A charge is a verified statement by the aggrieved
person of those actions he believes constitute employment
discrimination against him. The charging party need not
offer proof that the alleged actions constitute discrimination
to include them in the charge, as the purpose of the charge
is merely to trigger an investigation by the EEOC. Charges
are to be liberally construed to aid those persons lacking
technical skills in pleading and to further the purpose of the
law. 9 The charge should, however include all possible issues
and bases as the scope of judicial inquiry has been limited
to the issues reasonably arising from the charge or the scope
of the investigation.4" When a union contract determines employment practices, the union must be named as a party in
both the charge and the subsequent suit. Failure to name the
union may result in dismissal of the suit for failure to name
an indispensable party under Rule 19(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure."
Since Wyoming has a fair employment practices agency,
the EEOC may not assume jurisdiction over a charge before
the expiration of sixty days after proceedings are begun
37. WYO. STAT. § 27-260 (1967).
38. Denver District Office, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 1845
Sherman, Denver, Colorado 80203.
39. Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 531 F2d 455, 462-63 (5th Cir. 1970);
Cox v. United States Gypsum Co., 409 F.2d 289, 290 (7th Cir. 1969).
40. Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., supra note 39; Arey v. Providence Hosp.,
55 F.R.D. 62 (D.D.C. 1972).
41. E.g., Hardy v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 398 F. Supp. 64 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
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under state law, unless the FEC terminates its proceedings
earlier.42 The charge must be filed with the EEOC within
thirty days after the state agency terminates its proceedings
or three hundred days after the alleged violation occurs,
whichever is earlier.3 The charge should be timely filed
with the FEC or the federal cause of action may be barred
due to the expiration of the three hundred days." However,
if the discriminatory act can be considered a continuing act
of discrimination, and its continuing nature is alleged in
the charge, the time limitations have been held not to be
mandatory."
The charge must be served on the respondent within ten
days of the filing of the charge. 6 An investigation then takes
place; however, Title VII does not provide a specific time in
which the investigation must be completed. This failure to
require an investigation within a reasonable time is one of
the major drawbacks of Title VII.
Following the investigation, the EEOC is required to
issue a determination of whether reasonable cause exists to
believe the charge is true." Upon a finding of reasonable
cause, the EEOC must attempt to conciliate the charge.4" If
the respondent fails or refuses to confer, or if conferences
do not result in voluntary compliance with Title VII, the
respondent must be notified of the termination of the conciliation efforts. 9
Wyoming FEPA
The investigation and conciliation procedures under the
Wyoming FEPA are very similar to those under Title VII.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (Supp. V 1975).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (Supp. V 1975). In the absence of a state or
local agency, the charge must be filed within 180 days after the alleged
violation occurs.
44. See Dubois v. Packard Bell Corp., 470 F.2d 973 (10th Cir. 1972).
45. Bartmess v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 939 (1971); Cox v. United States Gypsum Co., supra note 39;
Tippett v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 316 F. Supp. 292 (M.D.N.C. 1970).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-5(b) (Supp. V 1975).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. 1975).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1) (Supp. V 1975); EEOC v. Container Corp. of
America, 352 F. Supp. 262 (M.D Fla. 1972).
49. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.23 (1975); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.25 (1975).
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Any person who believes he or she has been aggrieved by a
discriminatory or unfair labor practice may initiate state
proceedings by filing a complaint wth the FEC. 0 Complaints
may be amended or withdrawn at any time before the matter
is set for hearing and thereafter at the discretion of the
FEC.51 The FEPA does not specify a time period in which
charges must be filed; consequently, a charge could conceivably be filed several years later, after the cause of action
under Title VII had expired.
The Rules of Practice and Procedure require that an
investigation be made immediately after the filing of a complaint.2 The FEC practice, however, is to first attempt
informal resolution of the matter." A copy of the complaint,
along with a questionnaire, is sent to the employer. The
employer has fourteen days to respond before an investigator
personally contacts the employer to discuss the matter.
If the employer indicates an immediate willingness to
settle, a conciliation agreement is signed and the investigation terminates. If the employer fails to cooperate in any
manner, a public hearing will immediately be set. In cases
where the employer cooperates to the extent of answering the
questionnaire, but with no indication of a willingness to
settle, an investigation will be made by an FEC investigator.
The investigation is to determine whether there is probable
cause to believe the complaint and a hearing is warranted. 4
If probable cause is found, the FEC will write an opinion
which is sent to the parties before attempts are made to conciliate the matter." Otherwise, the complaint is dismissed
for lack of probable cause."
50. Wyo.

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

STAT. § 27-262 (1967); FEC R. PRAc. & P. 4(a)-(f). The complaint
must include the name and address of the complainant and the party alleged
to have committed the unlawful practice along with a short factual statement regarding the unlawful practice.
FEC R. PRAC. & P. 4(g)-(h).
FEC R. PRAC. & P. 5(a).
Interview with David Garcia, Director, Fair Employment Commission,
Barrett Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming (July 30, 1976); FEC Training
Manual (unpublished, available from FEC).
FEC R. PRAc. & P. 5(a).
Interview, supra note 53.
FEC R. PRAc. & P. 5(b).
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Where probable cause has been found, the person who
conducted the investigation must endeavor to eliminate the
practice by conference, persuasion or conciliation.57 The
practice of the FEC is to consult with the complainant concerning his or her demands, and generally seek all the available remedies for complainant, such as back pay, reinstatement, or promotion. 8 If conciliation efforts are successful,
a conciliation agreement is to be signed by the respondent
and any one Commissioner, then sent to the complainant."
If conciliation efforts are unsuccessful, a hearing is set.
ENFORCEMENT OF THE

FEPA AND TITLE VII

The state and federal statutes are similar in terms of
coverage and initial procedures. The primary differences are
in the method of enforcement following attempts to conciliate,
Title VII providing for a trial in the United States District
Court and the FEPA providing for administrative hearings
before the FEC which has the power to issue cease-and-desist
orders. The United States Congress, when Title VII was
amended in 1972, considered providing for agency enforcement by cease-and-desist orders but ultimately chose enforcement through federal litigation." In view of the time involved
to litigate a Title VII case due to crowded dockets, litigation
may not have been the most expedient method to choose.
The following discussion of federal and state hearing
procedures illustrates other important differences.
FederalCourt Actions Under Title VII
A civil action may be filed in the federal district court
by the charging party, the EEOC or the Attorney General.
A civil action may be filed by the EEOC against a private
employer or by the Attorney General against a political subdivision61 following completion of the investigation and conFEC R. PRAc. & P. 5(c).
Interview, supra note 53.
FEC R. PRAc. & P. 5(c).
H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972j U.S. CODE
CONG. & Ai. NEws 2137, 2167-76.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1) (Supp. V 1975).
57.
58.
59.
60.
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ciliation process. The suit will be dismissed if the EEOC has
failed to fulfill the statutory prerequisites of giving notice of
the charge, conducting an investigation, making a determination of reasonable cause, attempting to conciliate, and giving
notice of failure of conciliation. 2 The charging party may
not file an action unless the EEOC dismisses the charge or a
conciliation agreement has not been entered or suit filed by
the government within one hundred eighty days of the filing
of the charge. Prior to filing suit, the charging party must
obtain a Notice of Right to Sue from the EEOC, this notice
being a jurisdictional requirement in private suits.63 The
Notice of Right to Sue may be requested at any time after
the expiration of one hundred eighty days; however, the
EEOC does not notify the charging party of his right to request the notice until conciliation has failed and the government has decided not to file suit. 4 The EEOC or Attorney
General is not bound to complete conciliation efforts or file
suit within one hundred eighty days, so this provision provides relief to a charging party who feels the government
has been dilatory in handling his case. To avoid dismissal,
suit must be filed within ninety days of issuance of the
notice. 5
Exhaustion of remedies, other than filing a charge with
a state or local agency, is not required prior to filing suit.
The courts have held that Title VII complainants need not
exhaust their union contract grievance procedures;" howver, initiation of grievance procedures tolls the time limits
applicable to filing charges with the EEOC. 7 Where a complainant has resorted to the grievance procedure, neither the
complainant nor the EEOC is barred from seeking Title VII
remedies, as Title VII rights are independent of and supplemental to any other laws and institutions concerning job dis62. EEOC v. Western Elec. Co., Inc., 364 F. Supp. 188 (D. Md. 1973); EEOC
v. Container Corp. of America, supra note 48.
63. McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1) (Supp. V 1975) ; 29 C.F.R. § 1601.25 (1975).
65. Matyi v. Beer Bottlers Local 1187, 392 F. Supp. 60 (E.D. Mo. 1974). See
also Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971).
66. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
67. Malone v. North American Rockwell Corp., 457 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1972);
Hutchings v. United States Industries, Inc., 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970);
Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970).
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crimination. 8 The courts have also held acceptance of a
state fair employment practices agency settlement will not
bar further relief under Title VII.6 "
Intervention.
The charging party has a right of intervention in an
action brought by the EEOC or the Attorney General. Title
VII also provides for permissive intervention by the EEOC
or the Attorney General in an action brought by the charging
party.7" Where the EEOC has filed an action, the charging
party has a right to intervene in that action, but may not
file a separate action on the same charge.7 ' The prevailing
view holds, similarly, that after the charging party has filed
his own suit, the EEOC may not bring its own suit but rather
is limited to intervention in the charging party's suit.7" The
Tenth Circuit recently held that where the EEOC had intervened in a private suit but failed to identify aggrieved parties
other than the original plaintiffs, to plead a pattern and
practice of discrimination under § 707 of Title VII, or to seek
certification of a class for a proceeding under Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the EEOC action would be
dismissed for duplicity."
Nature of the Action.
Title VII suits are equitable in nature and as a result
the courts have consistently rejected demands for jury trials,
whether requested by plaintiff or defendant. 4 These actions
in the United States District Courts are trials de novo rather
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); EEOC v. McLean
Trucking Co., 525 F.2d 1007 (6th Cir. 1975).
Cooper v. Philip Morris, Inc., 464 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1972); Voutsis v. Union
Carbide Corp., 452 F.2d 889 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 918
(1972).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
Crump v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 369 F. Supp. 637 (E.D. Mo. 1973), in which
the Court dismissed the action as being multiplicitous; Cox v. United States
Gypsum Co., supra note 39.
EEOC v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 493 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1974).
EEOC v. Continental Oil Co., No. 75-1908 (10th Cir. Jan. 21. 1977).
Lynch v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 475 F.2d 764 (5th Cir. 1973);
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969);
Piva v. Xerox Corp., 376 F. Supp. 242 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
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than proceedings for judicial review of administrative
actions.7"
The judge must assign the case for hearing at the
earliest practicable date and expedite the proceedings in
every way. If the case is not scheduled for trial within one
hundred twenty days after issue is joined, he may appoint a
master pursuant to Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure."
Statute of Limitations.
Two statutes of limitations issues are commonly raised.
The state statutes of limitations for wage claims have been
applied to Title VII suits, resulting in dismissal, at least to
the extent that it is a suit to vindicate private rights as opposed to a governmental action for injunctive relief against
unlawful discrimination."
As previously mentioned, Title VII provides that only
the EEOC or the Attorney General shall have authority to
file suit during the initial one hundred eighty days. In motions to dismiss, defense counsel has argued that this provision constitutes a statute of limitations on actions by the
government after the one hundred eighty day period; however, several circuit courts have refused to accept this construction of the statute. 8
Preliminary Relief.
Title VII authorizes the EEOC and the Attorney General to seek preliminary relief where either one has de75. E.g., Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971); Beverly v.
Lone Star Lead Constr. Corp., 437 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 197.).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (5) (Supp. V 1975).
7'7. Dickson v. Mortgage & Trust, Inc., [1977] 7 LAin. Rm. RE'. (14 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas.) 334 (S.D. Tex. 1975); EEOC v. C & D Sportswear Corp., 398
F. Supp. 300 (M.D. Ga. 1975); EEOC v. Griffin Wheel Co., 511 F.2d 456
(5th Cir. 1975).
78. EEOC v. Cleveland Mills Co., supra note 29; EEOC v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 505 F.2d 610 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 824
(1974); EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 994 (1975); EEOC v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,
516 F.2d 1297 (3rd Cir. 1975); EEOC v. Myer Bros. Drug Co., 521 F.2d
1364 (8th Cir. 1975) ; EEOC v. General Dynamics Corp., 510 F.2d 382 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975).
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termined prompt judicial relief is necessary. 79 Although the
statutory language does not explicitly authorize private plaintiffs to seek such relief, the Fifth Circuit determined that
preliminary relief is similarly available to private plaintiffs
during the one hundred eighty day period that the charge
must remain before the EEOC.O To preserve the status
quo and prevent irreparable injury, preliminary relief is
proper in employment discrimination cases where the defendant's policies can be shown to be discriminatory and the
plaintiff is unemployed or frozen into a low-paying position.81
Class Actions.
Title VII places emphasis on protection of individual
rights. Since discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin by definition is class discrimination, the class action suit has been viewed as a logical device
for protecting the rights of many individuals at one time.82
Whether a suit may be maintained as a class action is
determined by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A single plaintiff who has met the Title VII prerequisites may properly maintain a class action on behalf of all
others similarly situated."3 According to the weight of authority, each putative member need not comply with the requirement that a charge be timely filed.84 An individual
plaintiff's failure to prevail on the merits of his own claim
is not a factor to be considered in determining whether the
action may be maintained as a class action under Rule 23."
79. 42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-5(f) (2) (Supp. V 1975); EEOC v. Midas, Inc., 8 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. q19 (D.N.M. 1974); Pennsylvania v. Rizzo, [1977] 7 LAB.
REL. REP. (13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.) 1468 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
80. Drew v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 480 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1973); Parks v.
Brennan, 389 F. Supp. 790 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
81. See United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 415 F.2d 1038, 1045 (5th Cir. 1969),
in which the Court stated that "irreparable injury should be presumed
from the very fact that the statute has been violated."
82. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., suprra note 66; Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach
Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1968) ; Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.,
319 F. Supp. 314 (E.D. La. 1970); Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp.
184 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
83. Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970).
84. Patterson v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 62 F.R.D. 351 (N.D. Ind. 1974);
Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., supra note 66; Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach
Corp., supra note 82; Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., supra note 82.
85. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 423 U.S. 814 (1976); Huff v. N.D. Cass
Co. of Alabama, 485 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1973).
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As the scope of judicial inquiry has been limited to the scope
of the investigation or issues reasonably arising from the
charge, the charge should be a complaint of class discrimination in a wide range of employment practices when a class
action is contemplated. 6
Maintaining class actions has been made a costly proposition by more stringent judicial interpretations of the notice
requirement under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure." The necessity and timing of notice depends on
whether the class is certified under Rule 23(b) (2) or Rule
23(b) (3). If the action is brought under Rule 23(b) (3),
notice to all class members is necessary, while the judge
exercises discretion over the giving of notice in other class
actions." Title VII cases are generally brought pursuant to
Rule 23(b) (2), which is designed primarily to allow class
injunctive relief against discriminatory practices." Notice
is not required under Rule 23(b) (2) where solely injunctive
relief is sought; however, notice may be required for affected
class members in cases seeking back pay relief to allow the
individuals to show entitlement.9 " This problem may best be
handled by bifurcating the trial and, upon a finding of liability, requiring notice to the affected class prior to trying
the damages issue to allow members to prove their damages."'
Attorney's Fees and Appointment of Counsel.
The court may, in its discretion, allow the prevailing
party, other than the Commission or the United States,
86. See Carr v. Conoco Plastics, Inc., 423 F.2d 57 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 951 (1970); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122
(5th Cir. 1969); Jiron v. Sperry Rand Corp., 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
730 (D. Utah 1975).
87. E.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
88. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2), (d).
89. Notes of Advisory Committee on 1966 Amendment to Rules, 28 U.S.C. app.
7765-66 (1970).
90. Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1975) ; Johnson v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974); Bing v.
Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1973). See generally, Edwards, The Back Pay Remedy in Title VII Class Actions: Problems of
Procedure, 8 GA. L. REV. 781 (1974).
91. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 520 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1976) (No.75-1475); Love v.
Pullman, 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 331 (D. Colo. 1975). See also Duncan v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 66 F.R.D. 615 (E.D. Wis. 1975), requiring the
employer to pay notice costs where the plaintiff was indigent and the
employer had offered him a substantial settlement, although claiming no
unlawful behavior.
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reasonable attorney's fees as part of the costs, and the prevailing party may receive costs unless special circumstances
would make the award unjust.2 The Fifth Circuit has established basic guidelines for the computation of attorney's
fees." The plaintiff need not seek specific individual relief
for attorney's fees to be awarded.94 The court has determined
that the fact that the attorney may be employed or funded
by a civil rights organization or tax-exempt foundation, or
that the attorney does not exact a fee, should not mitigate
the award of costs.95
The federal district court is authorized to appoint counsel and to allow commencement of the action without payment of costs if it deems such action just." Court-appointed
counsel is faced with a potentially expensive lawsuit, and is
not provided with costs for the generally lengthy discovery
or awarded attorney's fees unless his or her party prevails.
This serves to discourage attorneys from volunteering for
appointments as well as from taking a case from a lowincome client.
Hearings Pursuant to the Wyoming FEPA
The FEC has promulgated Rules of Practice and Procedure which set forth details relating to FEC hearings."
All parties are to be notified of the date, time, and place of
a hearing and advised that they may appear with counsel. 8
The complainants and respondents must appear or notify
the Commission of good reason for absence, or the Commission will enter a default decree against the absent party.
The hearing is conducted by the Commission with the
Commissioner of Labor and Statistics sitting as Chairman."
92. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (Supp. V 1975); Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
93. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., supra note 86.
94. Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 488 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1971).
95. Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1974); Thompson v. Madison
County Bd. of Educ., 496 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1974).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (f) (1) (Supp. V 1975).
97. The Rules of Practice and Procedure may be obtained from the Secretary of
State for the State of Wyoming or found in [1977] 3 EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE
(CCH) Para. 29,275 or [1977] 8 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 451:1305.
98. FEC R. PRAc. & P. 7(a)(2).
99. FEC R. PRAc. & P. 8(b).
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Note here that an apparent conflict of interest arises as the
Commissioner has technically been in charge of the prior
proceedings and presumably cannot sit as an impartial factfinder. The Rules attempt to solve the problem by providing
that no presiding or deciding officer shall have taken any
administrative part in any action prior to or during the
hearing, and that the investigator shall not participate in
the hearing, except as a witness, or in the deliberations.' 0
During the investigative process, an investigator is not to forward information regarding the investigation to any commissioner, and if a commissioner becomes aware of the particulars of any case, that commissioner is not to participate
Due to the nature of the administrative
in the hearing.'
of the Commissioner of Labor and
proximity
physical
and
Statistics and the investigators of the FEC, the adequacy of
this safeguard provision is questionable.
The Rules governing the conduct of hearings present
two problems. The complainant has the burden of making a
prima facie showing of a discriminatory or unfair employment practice, but the rules do not state what constitutes
such a showing, nor do they indicate what constitutes the
required rebuttal by the respondent.' - The testimony in all
hearings is to be reported, and the cost of reporting is assessed against the party who does not prevail at the hearing,
which may be prohibitive for an individual complainant."'
The FEPA does not provide for legal counsel to the FEC,
except that advice may be sought from any state agency;
an attorney from the Office of the Attorney General generally
fulfills this function. Nor does the FEC provide for prosecution by the FEC, at any stage, of the case arising as the
result of the complaint. Consequently, in order to proceed
beyond the conciliation stage, the complainant must hire
FEC R. PRAC. & P. 9(b) (2). In addition, it should be noted that, should the
Commissioner in any case have both investigative and adjudicative functions, this dual role has been approved by the Wyoming Supreme Court.
First Nat'l Bank of Thermopolis v. Bonham, 559 P.2d 42, 48 (Wyo. 1977)
(approving the performance of dual functions by the Wyoming Bank
Examiner).
101. FEC Training Manual, supra note 53.
102. FEC R. PnAc. & P. 8(i).
103. FEC R. PRAc. & P. 8(o).
100.
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counsel or represent himself, whereas, under Title VII, the
EEOC or the Attorney General may pursue the charge
through the litigation stage seeking relief for the charging
party as well as representing governmental interests. Therefore, the complainant whose case goes to a hearing has the
expense of attorney's fees and runs the risk of being assessed
costs if he or she does not prevail. Fortunately, during 1975
most conciliation efforts were successful and only seven cases,
in which conciliation was refused, went to a hearing.'
Subpoenas and Discovery.
Parties may apply to the Commission for the issuance
of subpoenas requiring the appearance of witnesses or the
production of documents or other relevant materials.1"' Such
subpoenas are to be enforced by the district court for the
county in which the hearing is being held upon application
Discovery is to be
for enforcement by the Commission.'
Administrative
Wyoming
the
with
conducted in accordance
7
Procedures Act," and discovery may be compelled by the district court in the same manner as subpoenas are enforced.' 0 8
Pre-Hearing Conference.
An informal pre-hearing conference may be required
by the Commission, at which time the parties are to appear
before the chairman to discuss simplification of the issues,
amendments to pleadings, admissions of fact and documents,
and other matters as may aid in disposition of the case.'"" A
pre-hearing memorandum reciting actions taken at the conference is prepared by the Commission and controls the case.
The Rules appear to preclude participation by the parties
in preparation of the memorandum, and allow for modification by the Commission only to prevent manifest injustice.
Final Order and Judicial Review.
If the respondent is found to be engaging in an unfair
or discriminatory employment practice, the Commission shall
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Interview, supra note 53.
FEC R. PRAC. & P. 9(a)(1).
FEC R. PRAC. & P. 9(a)(2).
WYo. STAT. § 9-276.25(g)-(h)
FEC R. PRAC. & P. 9(b).
FEC R. PREC. & P. 8(j)(2).

(Supp. 1975).
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enter an order requiring the respondent to cease and desist
from the practice. In addition, the respondent may be required to take affirmative action necessary to effectuate the
purposes of the Act, including but not limited to, hiring, reinstatement or upgrading of employees, with or without back
pay, and the posting of notices of making of reports."'
Appeals must be made to the district court in the
county in which the alleged practice occurred, the county in
which the respondent is ordered to cease and desist from a
practice or take other affirmative action, or the county in
which the respondent resides or transacts business."1 In
certain cases, this provision would provide an opportunity
to select a more favorable forum. The Act also provides for
permissive intervention by other parties in the proceedings
before the district court."'
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

The relevant body of law for equal opportunity employment cases in Wyoming is almost entirely composed of Title
VII decisions, since few cases have been decided by Wyoming
courts. Title VII law, however, has been and should be applicable in FEPA decisions for several reasons. Passage of
the FEPA one year after the passage of Title VII, similar
basic provisions in the laws, and the statutory authority for
the FEC to enter into agreements, exchange information and
otherwise assist the EEOC "' indicate that the intent of Title
VII and the FEPA is the same. The FEC has contracted with
the EEOC to handle complaints in the state office with funding from the EEOC.
The basic tenet of equal employment opportunity is that
each applicant for employment and each employee is to be
treated as an individual, not cast in a role based on his or her
race, color, national origin, religion or sex. One's opportunity
should be based on individual qualifications or lack thereof,
110. WYo. STAT. § 27-262 (1967).
111. WYO. STAT. § 2-7-263 (1967).
112. WYO. STAT. § 27-263 (1967).

113. WYo.

STAT.

§ 27-260(7) (1967).
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and lack of qualifications is a defense to the failure to hire,
promote or continue the employment of a member of a protected group. Opposition to equal employment laws results
primarily from the failure to understand that the laws do not
require employment of unqualified persons, but rather an
opportunity for all persons to fairly demonstrate their qualifications and compete for a job.
Several important principles of equal employment law
were established by the United States Supreme Court in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co." 4 In terms of proving discrimination, the most important ruling in the case is that intent to
discriminate is irrelevant to determining whether an employer has violated Title VII, as Congress directed the thrust
of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not
the motivation. Therefore, the employer need only have intended the use of any employment practices which have a discriminatory effect. According to Griggs, a practice which
screens out a disproportionately higher percentage of a protected group of persons is prohibited unless it is related
to
5
job performance and required by business necessity.'
The EEOC has issued guidelines interpreting Title VII
by more specifically delineating practices which constitute
discrimination."' Griggs held these guidelines are entitled
to great deference and shall be treated as expressing the
will of Congress.
Recruitment
Probably the most common method of recruitment for
employers and employment agencies is help-wanted advertisements in various publications. In any form of advertisement,
a preference, limitation or discrimination on a prohibited
basis is an initial and illegal bar to employment."' The rule
114. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
115. See discussion of business necssity as defense, infra.
116. Sex Discrimination Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.1 to .10 (1975); Religious
Discrimination Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1975); National Origin Discrimination Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. 8 1606.1 (1975); Testing and Selecting
Employees Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. 88 1607.1-.14 (1975).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (Supp. V 1975); Resolution of FEC with Relation
to Discriminatory Employment Advertisements, [1977] 3 EMPL. PRAC. GumE
(CCH) Para. 29,335.
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is absolute in terms of race or color, and qualified as to sex,
national origin and religion to allow discrimination only
where the discriminating characteristic is a bona fide occupational qualification." 8 Therefore, placing advertisements
in segregated columns of newspapers is a violation of Title
VII by the recruiting party, not the newspaper, and the publisher should be instructed on such publication.119
Word of mouth recruiting may serve to perpetuate effects of past discriminatory practices because it relies on
current employees who may not include members of protected groups due to prior screening practices. For example,
word of mouth recruitment in an all male or white department results in males or whites being most often contacted
and thereby illegally perpetuates past discrimination. 2 ' Notices of vacancies should be posted and other measures taken
to insure that employees in prviously segregated departments
and job classifications are aware of new job opportunities
to avoid illegally perpetuated discrimination within a
company. 2 '
Another pitfall for employers can be the use of referrals
where the referral source is practicing discrimination, such
as an employment agency which will refer only one sex for a
particular kind of job or a union with racially biased admission policies. Relying on such referrals may also result in
the unlawful perpetuation of past discrimination.'22
Screening and Evaluating Methods
When a job opening occurs, employers generally consider a number of applicants or employees for the position.
118. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (Supp. V 1975). See discussion of bona fide occupational qualification as a defense, infra.
119. Brush v. S.F. Newspaper Printing Co., 469 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 943 (1973).
120. United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973); NAACP
v. Beecher, 371 F. Supp. 507 (D. Mass. 1974), af'd, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975); Rock v. Norfolk & Western R.R.
Co., 473 F.2d 1344 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 862 (1973).
121. Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Machine Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied. 409 U.S. 862 (1972).
122. EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975), petition for
cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3047 (U.S. Sept. 12, 1975) (No. 75-393); Parham
v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., supra note 83.
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Methods have been devised to evaluate and screen those being
considered in the process of making a hiring or promotion
decision. Some of these practices screen out persons directly
or indirectly on the basis of their race, sex, national origin,
color or religion and violate Title VII and the FEPA. Practices are not unlawful, however, if they are reasonably related to successful job performance, required by business
necessity, and applied in a consistent manner to all applicants. The employer123 must also show that no suitable alternative is available.
Whether or not an applicant is hired or an employee is
promoted into a job should depend on an objective appraisal
of the person's qualifications in relationship to the job description and the qualifications necessary to successful job
performance. All employment and personnel policies should
be written an objective to provide both guidelines to personnel responsible for carrying them out and a safeguard against
an exercise of personal bias. The policy on interviewing applicants for employment should not allow personnel to make
subjective evaluations of applicants, and a lack of formal
objective guidelines on hiring has supported a finding of discrimination.2 Proof that more weight was given to subjective evaluations of interest, attitude and personality than
objective criteria, that formal objective guidelines were not
provided for job interviews and that exclusively non-minority
minority applicants
personnel were employed to interview
5
12
has been found to be discriminatory.
Records of all applications and data relating thereto
must be kept for six months from the date the record is made
or an employment decision is made, whichever is later. 21 If
records are destroyed during the six-month period, the EEOC
will consider aggrieved applicants to be qualified."'
123.

EEOC Testing and Selecting Employees Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3

(1975).

Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Lee Way Motor Freight Inc., 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 710 (D.
Okla. 1973).
125. Reed v. Arlington Hotel Co., 276 F.2d 721 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
854 (1973); Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Machine Co., supra note 121.
126. EEOC Reporting and Record Keeping, 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14 (1975).
127. EEOC Decision, No. 71-1477 (March 19, 1971); EEOC Decision, No. 70-92
(August 19, 1969).
124.
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A popular screening device is pre-hire inquires, which
may be made verbally or on a written application form. Inquiries related to race, sex, national origin, color or religion
are not violations of Title VII per se. The employer must
have a lawful explanation, however, or the fact that the inquiry was made may constitute evidence of discrimination
which carries significant weight in the EEOC's decision as
to whether or not Title VII has been violated." These inquiries seldom relate to the applicant's abilities or qualifications, but they may be necessary to meet reporting requirements on applicants and employees of protected groups by
local, state or federal government. In this instance the inquiry would serve a lawful purpose and would not constitute
discrimination.12 As a practical matter, the precaution of
explaining the necessity of the inquiry to the applicant or
employee may be necessary. Also, employers and employment
agencies should carefully select application forms, as many
of the older purchased forms often contain unlawful questions. New forms are now on the market that set apart any
questions which may be unlawful if the employer cannot
justify their use, and the applicant is instructed to answer
only those questions in that group which the employer has
indicated are necessary questions for the particular job.
The FEC has written information on employment application forms which may lead to discrimination, listing common
questions and an explanation of how these questions may
discriminate.'
Inquiries or coding of applications as to the race or national origin of an individual coupled with a low representation of that minority group in the workforce, union membership or referral lists support a finding of discrimination. 1 '
Coding on applications has sometimes been difficult to detect
without very thorough investigation.
128. EEOC Release, re Pre-Hire Inquiries (January 13, 1966, a8 ao nded May
27, 1968).
129. Id.
130. WYOMING FAIR EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION, EMPLOYMENT APPLICATION
FORMS WHICH MAY LEAD To DISCRIMINATION (1976).
131. Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co., 365 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 19-73), aff'd sub.
nom. EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975), petition
for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3047 (U.S. Sept. 12, 1975) (No. 75-393).
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Pre-hiring inquiries and qualifications standards related
to the marital or parental status of the applicant cannot be
applied only to women. Questions regarding marital status
may be asked in good faith and for a non-discriminatory
purpose."
An employer cannot utilize a rule regarding
marital status which is not applied equally to both sexes,
resulting in the restriction of employment of one sex.' The
airlines previously would not employ married women as
stewardesses while no men were similarly prohibited; however, the courts held the policy was not justified by a bona
Pre-hiring inquiries and
fide occupational qualification.'
restrictions on employment related to pre-school children
must also be applied to men as well as women. 3 ' Any prehire inquiry which expresses, directly or indirectly, any limitation, specification or discrimination as to sex is unlawful
unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification.'
Any employment practice or policy which excludes women
from employment for pregnancy is a prima facie violation of
Title VII under the EEOC guidelines. 37
Employee selection criteria which exclude applicants on
the basis of sex are unlawful unless the employer can demonstrate sex is a "bona fide occupational qualification" reasonThe
ably necessary to the normal operation of the business.'
EEOC has issued guidelines on sex discrimination under
Title VII which state that this exception should be narrowly
interpreted. 3 ' These guidelines provide that a refusal to
consider an individual for a particular job on the basis of
sex-related characteristics and stereotypes, or the preference
of co-workers, clients or customers is not justified. 4 ' A shining example of this practice is the airlines' employment of
stewardesses and not stewards, which also points out that
sex discrimination is not synonymous with discrimination
132. EEOC Sex Discrimination Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.7 (1975).
133. EEOC Sex Discrimination Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.4(a) (1975).
134. Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 991 (1971).
135. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Co., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
136. EEOC Sex Discrimination Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.7 (1975).
137. EEOC Sex Discrimination Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(a) (1975).
138. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (Supp. V 1975).
139. EEOC Sex Discrimination Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.1-.10 (1975).
140. EEOC Sex Discrimination Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1975).
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against women. 4 ' The rule that preferences of customers
and co-workers is not a valid reason for refusing to consider
an individual is also true in cases involving race, national
origin, color and religion.'
The findings of fact in the FEC decision in Pfister v.
NiobraraCounty,' 3 show a blatant example of this type of
sex discrimination by a sheriff who refused to consider a
female applicant for a position as deputy sheriff. He conceded her qualifications but stated he could not forward her
application to the county commissioners for consideration
because he believed the county commissioners would not consider hiring a female. At the FEC hearing the Sheriff testified that he did not hire Carmen Pfister because he had a
two-man department with no job opening for a matron or a
secretary, the people in the county have disapproved, and he
did not think it would be right to pick up someone else's wife
in the middle of the night to patrol "out in the boondocks."
These statements indicate the exclusion of an applicant on
the basis of sex, sex-related characteristics and stereotypes,
or the preference of those receiving services, each of which
is specifically prohibited by Title VII and has been held discriminatory by the FEC. The reviewing district court found
sex discrimination but reversed for lack of jurisdiction.'"
An employer may refuse to hire a male with long hair
on the basis of an appearance code designed to maintain a
certain image. Hairstyles are not immutable characteristics
like race or sex.' Whether or not an appearance code which
fails to accommodate an applicant or employee's observance
of religious rules is discriminatory has yet to be decided on
the merits by the courts, but the EEOC has decided this constitutes discrimination.4 6
141. Diaz v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971).
142. Anderson v. Methodist-Evangelical Hosp., Inc., 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
33 (W.D. Ky. 1971), ajf'd, 464 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1972).
143. No. 30-1974 (FEC April, 1975).
144. Pfister v. Niobrara County, No. 12-169 (Wyo. Dist. Ct., 6th Dist., Oct. 28,
1975), aff'd, 557 P.2d 735 (Wyo. 1976).
145. Baker v. California Land Title Co., 349 F. Supp. 235 (C.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd,
507 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1046 (1975).
146. EEOC Decision, No. 71-779 (Dec. 21, 1970); EEOC Decision, No. 71-2620
(June 25, 1971). See also EEOC v. Rollins, Inc., 8 Empl. Prac. Cas. 492
(N.D. Ga. 1974).
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Physical requirements such as height and weight or
strength standards have particular disparate impact on men
and women and certain minorities, particularly Spanishsurnamed Americans. The National Origin Discrimination
Guidelines cite as an example of discrimination denial of
equal opportunity to persons who as a class of persons fall
outside the national norms for height and weight where such
height and weight specifications are not necessary for the
performance of the work involved.14 Again, these standards
must be applied uniformly, be reasonably related to job performance and justified by business necessity.'48 Some of the
standards held unlawful have been maximum body weight
standards applied to female flight attendants but not male
flight attendants," 9 limits on the amount of weight females
can lift as opposed to individual testing of all employees,1
jobs characterized as strenuous or heavy being limited to
males based on assumptions about the abilities of females.'
A very high percentage of racial and ethnic minorities
are arrested but not necessarily convicted.'
Therefore, hiring standards based on arrest records will generally screen
out a higher number of minorities and constitute discrimination absent the required showing. 53 Records of convictions
are more often found to have bearing on successful job performance, but nonetheless the employer cannot make a sweeping rejection of applicants with criminal convictions. The
147. EEOC National Origin Discrimination Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (1975).
148. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 277 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Ga. 1967),
rev'd on other grounds, 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969); Meadows v. Ford
Motor Co., 62 F.R.D. 98 (W.D. Ky. 1974). But see Castro v. Beecher, 459
F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972).
149. Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., [1976] 7 LAB. RE,. REP. (13 Empl.
Prac. Cas.) 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, Inc.,
8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1235 (C.D. Cal. 1974), injunction denied, [1976]
7 LAB. REL. REP. (13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.) 1205 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
150. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.. supra note 66; Long v. Sapp, 502 F.2d 34
(5th Cir. 1974). But see Gudbrandson v. Genuine Parts Co., 297 F. Supp.
134 (D. Minn. 1968).
151. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., supra note 148; Taylor v. Goodyear
Tire and Rubber Co., 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 50 (N.D. Ala. 1972).
152. Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970), modilied, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972).
153. Id.; Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
950 (1972). See City of Cairo v. Illinois FEPC, 21 Ill. App. 3d 358, 315
N.E.2d 344 (1974).
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employer must be able to demonstrate the necessity of a
standard related to convictions.'"
Members of minority groups have not only had less opportunity for employment; they have also had less opportunity for education and training. Consequently, education
and training standards may screen out a disproportionate
number of minorities and may not be required arbitrarily.
For example, in United States v. Georgia Power Co., 5 high
school diplomas were required by the defendant for entry
level jobs such as laborer, screening out a high number of
blacks, without a demonstration that high school diplomas
were required by business necessity and related to job performance.1 "6 The same demonstration is necessary to justify
other education and training requirements. 5 ' Where such
demonstration has been made no discrimination has been
found."'
Written performance tests are one means of measuring a
person's qualifications.'
In Griggs, the United States Supreme Court stated that a test must measure the person for
the job, not the person in the abstract.' 0 Professionally developed ability tests which are not designed, intended or used
to discriminate are specifically authorized by the EEOC
guidelines on testing. 6 ' Many tests, however, do exclude
minority group members at a higher rate because they test
more than job-related qualities, such as certain cultural
values or assumptions which racial or ethnic minorities do
154. Richardson v. Hotel Corp. of America, 332 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. La. 1971),
aff'd 468 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1972); Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 523
F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975).
155. Supra note 120.
156. Statistics cited in the case showed in the 25 to 44 age group in the South,
64.7% of white males, 35% of black males, 63% of white females, and 34.7%
of black females have completed high school. Id. at 918.
157. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra note 114; United States v. Georgia Power
Co., supra note 120; Harkless v. Sweeny Ind. School Dist., 388 F. Supp.
738 (S.D. Tex. 1975); Roman v. Reynolds Metals Co., 368 F. Supp. 47 (S.D.
Tex. 1973).
158. Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 228 (D. Colo. 1971), afj'd,
475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972); McGaffney v. Southwest Mississippi Gen.
Hosp., 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1312 (D. Miss. 1973), aff'd. 6 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 1123 (5th Cir. 1973); Cooper v. Allen, 493 F.2d *765 (5th Cir.
1974) ; Stone v. E.D.S. Federal Corp., 351 Supp. 340 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
159. EEOC Testing and Selecting Employees Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.2
(1975).
160. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra note 114.
161. Id.; Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody 442 U.S. 407 (1975).
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not relate to in the same manner as white persons. These
tests, like other screening devices, are unlawful if they operate to exclude a protected group and cannot be shown to be
related to job performance.12
A prima facie case of discriminatory testing is ordinarily made by a showing that the test has an adverse impact on a protected group, which the defendant may rebut
by proving the test has been professionally validated as a
predictor of job performance. 6 ' As a general rule, evidence
that minority group test-takers failed a particular written
examination at a significantly higher rate than white testtakers establishes adverse impact. The numbers must be statistically significant, which one case defines as a relationship
sufficiently high to have a probability of not more than one in
two of having occurred by chance.'
If the statistics are not
sufficiently reliable, the courts may also consider census statistics which show a disparity between the minorities in the
employer's workforce and in the general labor force of the
community and indicate that minorities are being screened
out disproportionately.
Rebuttal evidence that the test has been validated by one
of several methods can then be presented. Criterion-related
or empirical validation, the preferred method, demonstrates
that the test has been validated with one or more exterior variables or criteria, such as work proficiency data, supervisory
6 5 Evidence of
ratings or regularity of attendance at work."
content or construct validity may be appropriate where criterion-related validity is not feasible. 6 ' This involves identifying skills and knowledge needed to perform a job in an independent job analysis and then determining if the test being
162. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, supra note 161.
163. Davis v. Washington, 423 U.S. 820 (1976); NAACP v. Beecher, eupra note
120; United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972).
164. Kinsey v. Legg, Mason & Co., Inc., 62 F.R.D. 462 (D.D.C. 1974).
165. EEOC Testing and Selecting Employees Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5
(1975); Vulcan Soc'y v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 360 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), ajf'd, 490 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1973).
166. EEOC Testing and Selecting Employees Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5
(1975).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1977

29

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 12 [1977], Iss. 2, Art. 4

516

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XII

used tests for the skills and knowledge needed for the job.1"7
Other methods, such as differential validation, which requires
separate collection of data for both men and non-minority
groups, may also be used. The EEOC guidelines should be
followed in every instance as they are to be given great deference by the courts, and a use of a test will generally be enjoined unless it is validated in accordance with the guidelines.1"8 If no showing of test validity is made, use of the
Where evidence of validity
test has been held unlawful.'
the sufficiency of the valibecomes
issue
legal
is offered, the
dation study as proof that the test predicts job performance.
In many instances, courts have found the evidence of validity
insufficient and the test therefore unlawful.17
Job Classificationand Assignment
The days of open and notorious segregation of black
and brown employees from white employees in both jobs and
facilities are gone, but less obvious employment practices and
policies still result in segregation. An imbalance in the distribution of women and racial and ethnic minorities within
an employer's workforce is generally indicative of discriminatory policies and practices relating to job classification
and assignment. "1 For example, racial and ethnic minorities have been assigned to entry-level jobs, such as janitor or
laborer, regardless of qualifications. 72 Many trucking companies have historically maintained segregated job classifications by refusing to assign female or minority employees
to over-the-road driver positions. 7 '
167. Kirkland v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Serv., 374 F. Supp.
1361 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rew'd on other grounds, 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975).
168. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra note 114; Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
supra note 161.
169. United tSates v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., supra note 163.
170. E.g., NAACP v. Beecher, supra note 120; Western Addition Community
Organization v. Alioto, 360 F. Supp. 733 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Bridgeport
Guardians v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 354 F. Supp. 778 (D. Conn.
1973) ; United States v. Georgia Power Co., supra note 120; Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, supra note 161.
171. Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co., supra note 131; Bush v. Lone Star Steel
Co., 373 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Tex. 1974).
172. United States v. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co., 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
939 (D. Ariz. 1973); Roman v. ESB, Inc., 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1063
(D.S.C. 1973).
173. E.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., supra note 85; United States v. Lee
Way Motor Freight, Inc., supra note 124.
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Allegations are often made in Title VII cases that an
employer has discriminated by assigning a protected group
only to lower paying, less desirable jobs which have fewer
opportunities for advancement. 174 One of the most common
forms of segregated job classifications is the all-white male
managerial and supervisory classifications, generally resulting from a failure to hire or promote women and minorities to
these positions of authority and responsibility. 175 Classifying certain jobs as male or female, whether explicitly in a
policy or implicitly by a practice, is both common and unlawful.7 6 This job assignment problem may result from subjective assessments by supervisors who have not been profollow written, objective selection
vided with or instructed to
177
and assignment criteria.
An employee who is assigned to a part-time, temporary
or probationary position has all the same protections as fulltime, permanent employees in terms of equal employment
opportunity. The probationary employee is generally the
most vulnerable to any form of bias held by a supervisor and
feels less able to protect him or herself due to uncertainty
about his or her job performance and inability to join a union
during this period. An employee may be terminated during
the probationary period for reasons such as poor job performance" or work force reduction," 9 unless the employees
of one race, sex, national origin, color or religion are being
treated in a different manner than other probationary employees. Such unlawful bias has been found where blacks
were more frequently disciplined and discharged during this
period than whites, and only whites were granted extended
174. See cases cited in note 172, supra.
175. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974);
Bush v. Lone Star Steel Co., supra note 171; Russell v. American Tobacco
Co., 374 F. Supp. 286 (M.D.N.C. 1973), modified, 528 F.2d 357 (4th Cir.
1975). But see Roman v. ESB, Inc., supra note 172.
176. Peterson v. Rath Packing Co., 461 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1972); Weeks v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., supra note 148; Nance v. Union Carbide
Corp., 397 F. Supp. 436 (W.D.N.C. 1975).
177. Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 369 F. Supp. 522 (W.D. Pa. 1973);
Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., supra note 175; Bush v. Lone
Star Steel Co., supra note 171.
178. Rice v. Gates Rubber Co., 521 F.2d 782 (6th Cir. 1975).
179. United States v. Hayes Intl Corp., 295 F. Supp. 803 (N.D. Ala. 1970),
rev'd on other grounds, 456 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1972).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1977

31

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 12 [1977], Iss. 2, Art. 4

518

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XII

probationary periods as opposed to termination. 8 ' A protected group cannot initially be given a longer period of
probation with more conditions than other employees, 18 ' or
treated differently with respect to any other terms and conditions of employment.' 82
The Wyoming FEC in Kaufholz v. Cheyenne Fire Department,' found sex discrimination essentially based on
a difference in the treatment of a female firefighter and
male firefighters during the six-month probationary period.
Vicki Kaufholz was the first and only woman employed as
a firefighter in Cheyenne, Wyoming, receiving a job after
attaining the highest score on a written examination. The
media were allowed to photograph and question her continuously throughout her employment. After she was hired, a
strength and agility test was instituted, which she passed,
and a program of calisthenic exercises was implemented only
for the period of her employment. The FEC also found the
Department made no distinction between her training and
testing, and trained her for a pumper truck but assigned her
to a ladder truck which had different equipment. She also
was not issued proper equipment and clothing. Without forewarning, she was told of recorded deficiencies in her work
and her probationary period was terminated five and onehalf months after she had begun. The FEC seems to imply,
although it did not specifically state, that its finding of sex
discrimination is based on a finding that some of these employment practices were a reaction to the employment of h
female and sex stereotypes, while other practices were not
similarly applied to male firefighters during their period
of probation.
Promotions,Seniority and Layoffs
An employee's future and security in his or her job are
very important. All too often members of protected groups
have found themselves without a future or security regard180. EEOC Decision, No. 71-797 (Dec. 21, 1970).
181. Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., supra note 149.
182. E.g., Lowry v. Whitaker Cable Corp., 348 F. Supp. 202 (W.D. Mo. 1972),
aff'd, 472 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1973).
183. No. 18-1975 (FEC April 13, 1976).
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less of their qualifications or performance. Decisions on
promotions, like decisions on hiring and job assignment,
should be made on the basis of qualifications for the job, not
on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex or religion.
Nevertheless, the low percentages of women and minorities
in the higher-paying, more responsible job categories into
which employees can be promoted indicates these factors are
determinative in many promotional decisions."' However,
the courts have refused to find discrimination in cases where
the employer has proven other candidates for promotion were
better qualified than the plaintiff. 8 ' The showing of qualifications must be based on objective evaluations of the employee's qualifications in relation to a job related criteria,
or it will not be sufficient to prove the failure to promote
was not discriminatory.'
As in hiring decisions, the use of
predominantly or all-white or all-male personnel to make
promotional decisions affecting racial and ethnic minorities
and women has been held to result in discriminatory practices.187 If tests are used, the testing standards relative to
hiring also apply to promotions."'
A seniority system is generally based on the length of
time spent in a job, department or company and is used to
determine the competing rights of workers, such as rights
to promotion and transfer. Seniority is generally used by
employers for two separate functions: benefit-type seniority
measures the benefits such as pensions and vacation time,
and competitive-type seniority gives the employee with the
longer time on the job an advantage over a newer employee
in competition for promotions, transfers and recalls, as well
as protection from layoffs. A seniority system can have a
discriminatory effect when, due to prior exclusion from cer184.
185.

186.
187.
188.

Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co., supra note 131; EEOC Decision, No. 71562 (Dec. 4, 1970).
Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Ref. Corp., 350 F. Supp. 139 (S.D. Ga. 1972),
af'd, 495 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974);
Smith v. South Central Bell Tel. Co., 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 609 (M.D.
Tenn. 1974), aff'd 518 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1975).
Rowe v. General Motors Corp., supra note 124; Newman v. AVCO Corp.,
313 F. Supp. 1069 (M.D. Tenn. 1973). But see Privette v. Union Carbide
Corp., 395 F. Supp. 372 (W.D.N.C. 1975).
Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Ref. Corp., supra note 185; United States v.
N.L. Industries, 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973).
See discussion of testing as a screening and evaluating device, supra.
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tain jobs, progression lines or departments, the members of a
minority group have been prevented from acquiring seniority
relevant to those jobs, progression lines or departments. The
ramifications range from loss of benefits to more exposure
to layoffs for the employee who is transferred or promoted
after desegregation, giving present effect to the results of
5 9 Notwithstanding an express exempprior discrimination."
tion of a "bona fide seniority or merit system" from the prohibitions of Title VII, 9 ° the courts have generally held seniority systems to be unlawful to the extent that they perpetuate the effects of past discrimination, unless a system is
shown to be required as a matter of business necessity.
Job or departmental seniority in a previously segregated
business perpetuates the effects of past discrimination and
has been the subject of frequent litigation. Even though a
plant may no longer be segregated, all minority and female
employees allowed into previously white or male jobs or
departments will have less seniority in that job or department,
and therefore cannot compete with or receive the same
benefits as the whites or males even though they may have
more plant seniority. In this situation the courts have required the use of plant seniority,' unless a valid experience
requirement is a prerequisite to promotion or transfer into
the job or department, in which case the courts have granted
as relief job or departmental seniority from the date the
employee was hired or acquired the necessary experience,
whichever is later. 2 In class actions, relief in the form of
seniority is limited to those persons who can prove they were
in fact victims of the discrimination." 3 Employees entitled
189. Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws:
A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82
HARm. L.
-REv.
1598 (1969).
190. 42 U.S.C. § 20OOe-2(h) (1970).
191. EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., supra note 122; United States v. Georgia
Power Co., supra note 120; United States v. N.L. Industries, supra note
187; United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971);
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., supra note 75; Local 189, United Paperworkers
& Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 919 (1970); Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D.
Va. 1968).
192. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., supra note 85; Rodriguez v. East Texas
Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3670
(U.S. May 24, 1976) (No. 75-718).
193. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., supra note 85; Patterson v. American
Brands, Inc., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 314 (4th Cir. 1976).
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to promotions or transfers on the basis of plant-wide or retroactive seniority may not bump junior employees out of their
present jobs; rather the new seniority should be asserted only
with respect to new job openings."'
In some operations the lines of progression from one
job to another were segregated, which meant the employees
performed the same work in separate departments. The
courts have ordered that when departments
were desegre1 5
merged.
be
to
had
lists
seniority
the
gated,
In other instances, the minority and female workers
have progressed in a restricted progression of jobs to a job
which pays less than the upper levels of jobs from which they
have been restricted and more than the entry level of those
jobs. This required cut in pay deters employees from entering the desegregated jobs as it means a loss of pay until they
can progress to the upper levels, and thereby perpetuates the
discrimination. The remedy devised for this type of discrimination is "red circling" of wage rates which permits the
transferring employee to receive his or her current wage
rate until the employee attains a level in the new line of
progression with a higher wage rate.'
Traditionally, seniority systems have dictated that the
last employee in is the first employee out when layoffs or
other workforce reduction measures are necessary. The obvious problem in the discrimination context is that many of
the newer employees in a job, department or plant are members of protected groups who have been employed, promoted
or transferred in recent years as a result of equal employment requirements imposed on employers. While there is
some conflict in the decided cases, the dominant view at the
present time is that Title VII does not prohibit senioritybased layoffs in a context of past hiring discrimination, at
least where the laid-off employees had not been personally
194. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., supra note 85.
195. Rock v. Norfolk & Western R.R. Co., supra note 120; United States v. N.L.
Industries, supra note 187.
196. Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 321 F. Supp. 1241 (E.D. La. 1971);
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., supra note 75.
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discriminated against." 7 However, layoffs on the basis of
departmental seniority have been held unlawful where blacks
who had been excluded from transferring into certain departments were laid off while whites in the formerly white
departments, who had less plantwide seniority, were not
affected." 8
Where an employer has imposed mandatory leave for
maternity but not for any other non-work-related disability,
it has been held unlawful to fail to credit female employees
returning from maternity leave with previously accumulated
seniority for purposes of bidding on job openings. '
Terms and Conditions
A myriad of employment practices constitutes what may
be generally referred to as the terms and conditions of employment. Generally, any rules or regulations must apply
and all rights and benefits be conferred to all employees
equally, regardless of race, national origin, color, sex or religion. The interests of the employer and the employees
must be balanced, the touchstone being business necessity." 0
For example, employers maintaining facilities segregated on
the basis of race or national origin have been held to be discriminating and ordered to discontinue the practice.2 ' Vacation time, sick leave, and holidays may be conditioned on a
factor such as length of service for the employer, but may
not be applied in a different manner to one group than
another on an unlawful basis. 22
An interesting issue concerns an employer's obligation
to accommodate an employee's religious needs, particularly
197. Watkins v. Steelworkers Local 2369, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975); Waters
v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2214 (1976).
198. Cox v. Allied Chemical Corp., 382 F. Supp. 309 (M.D. La. 1974).
199. Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 522 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1975), aff' 384 F. Supp.
765 (M.D. Tenn. 1974), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3508 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1977)
(No. 75-536).
200. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra note 114.
201. Buckner v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 4176 F.2d 1287 (5th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., supra note 163.
202. Rice v. Litton Systems, Inc., 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 763 (D.D.C. 1974),
aff'd, 530 F.2d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1976); EEOC Decision, No. 72-0324 (Aug.
18, 1971).
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as related to time off for religious observances. The employer
must make reasonable accommodations for sincerely asserted
religious beliefs of employees, the defense for a failure to do so
being a demonstration of undue hardship."' Title VII defines
religion as all aspects of religious observance and practice, as
well as belief, unless the employer meets the burden of proving undue hardship which would have the effect of excepting
such practices from protection."0 4 The issue has generally
been whether the rearranging of work schedules would constitute hardship.0 5 In determining what constitutes undue
hardship, the courts have emphasized the undue aspect and
held that a showing of inconvenience or necessity to pay overtime or mild and infrequent complaints from co-workers is
insufficient."' This issue of accommodation is currently before the United States Supreme Court in several cases.2 07
The Title VII requirement that employers reasonably accommodate religious practices was recently declared a violation
of the establishment clause of the United States Constitution,
a federal district court finding the government had not maintained the requisite neutrality on the religious question.0 8
One Wyoming FEC decision, Banyai v. Salt Creek
Freightways, 9 deals with religious discrimination arising
from termination of an employee for taking an unapproved
leave of absence to attend a religious convocation. She requested a leave of absence without pay in the proper manner
and received an unqualified refusal. The FEC held the complainant has the burden of demonstrating authentic or valid
religious conviction. This showing shifts the burden to the
203. EEOC Guidelines on Religious Discrimination, 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1975);
Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), af'd by an

equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971) (upholding the guidelines).
204. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp. V 1975).
205. Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 468 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,

45 U.S.L.W. 3364 (U.S. Nov. 16, 1976) (No. 75-1105); Cummins v. Parker

Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 424 U.S. 942 (1976).
206. Shaffield v. Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Serv., Inc., 373 F. Supp. 937
(M.D. Ala. 1974); Kettell v. Johnson & Johnson, 337 F. Supp. 892, 895
(E.D. Ark. 1972); Hardison v. Trans World Airlines Inc., 527 F.2d 33 (8th
Cir. 1975); cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3363 (U.S. Nov. 16, 1976) (No. 76-

1126) ; Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., supra note 205.
207. Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., supra note 205; Hardison v. Trans World

Airlines, Inc., supra note 206.

208. Yott v. North American Rockwell Corp., 45 U.S.L.W. 2367 (C.D. Cal. Jan.
10, 1977).
209. No. 47-1974 (FEC July 11, 1975).
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respondent to prove efforts were made to reasonably accommodate the complainant's religious practices without incurring undue hardship in the conduct of the respondent's business or that any further accommodation would have created
such hardship. In this case, the Respondent was found to
have admitted that allowing the complainant three days
leave would not have incurred undue hardship. The Respondent was ordered to cease and desist from discriminatory employment practices on the basis of creed, to post notices relative to equal employment opportunity, to file reports on any
additional action taken, and to pay $1,800.40 in backpay.
The FEC clearly applied principles of law developed under
Title VII in this decision. Following an appeal to the district
court and remand to the FEC, the agency again found discrimination and awarded the complainant $3,798.15.10
The most important contemporary issues in sex discrimination concern fringe benefits such as medical insurance,
life insurance, and retirement plans, which must be provided
equally to employees of both sexes. 1' An employer's conditioning of fringe benefits on principal wage-earner status is
a prima facie violation of Title VII since such benefits "tend
to be available only to male employees and their families." 1 '
An employer cannot make benefits available to the wives of
of male employees which are not made available to female
employees."' The fact that the cost of such benefits is
greater with respect to one sex than the other is not a defense
according to the EEOC guidelines." 4
The EEOC guidelines state that pregnancy-related disabilities must be treated like any other temporary disability
for all job-related purposes, including providing sick leave,
sick pay, medical and health insurance, and disability income
protection plan. 1 ' The United States Supreme Court deci210. Id. (FEC March 28, 1977), on remand from No. 41-126 (Wyo. Dist. Ct.,
7th Dist., Nov. 12, 1976).
211. EEOC Sex Discrimination Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9 (1975).
212. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(c) (1975); Chastang v. Flynn and Emrich Co., 365 F.
Supp. 957 (D. Md. 1973); Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 477 F.2d
90 (3d Cir. 1973).
213. EEOC Sex Discrimination Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(d) (1975).
214. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(d) (1975); Taylor v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
supra note 150.
215. EEOC Sex Discrimination Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1975).
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sion in GeneralElectric Co. v. Gilbert 1 ' struck a serious blow
to this guideline. The Court found exclusion of pregnancyrelated disabilities from an employee disability benefit plan
does not constitute sex discrimination, following the rationale
of Geduldig v. Aiello217 which held a similar exclusion from
a state disability benefit program did not violate the Equal
Protecton Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Termination of any employee for a temporary disability
is unlawful if it has a disparate impact on employees of one
sex and is not justified by business necessity.2 18 Cases challenging the guideline as to the treatment of pregnancy-related
absences, the ability of a pregnant employee to continue working, and the denial of seniority benefits to employees on
pregnancy leave are now pending before the United States
Supreme Court.2 1 Mandatory pregnancy leave policies established by school boards fixing times for the leave of absence to commence have been held arbitrary and not justified
by a legitimate state interest in cases brought under the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.2 2
Two states' unemployment compensation laws which imposed
special restrictions on women workers unemployed due to
pregnancy and childbirth have recently been declared unconstitutional. 221
EVIDENCE OF DISCRIMINATION

The initial burden of proof rests on the plaintiff to establish a right to prevail in the action. A prima facie case
of employment discrimination may be established by several
means, depending on the nature of the suit. Proof of discrimination is seldom direct and a plaintiff does not always have
to show specific instances of discrimination to prevail. One
of the most common methods of proving the discriminatory
45 U.S.L.W. 4031 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1976) (Nos. 74-1589 & 74-1590).
417 U.S. 484 (19174).
EEOC Sex Discrimination Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(c) (1975).
Richmond United School Dist. v. Berg, 528 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3508 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1977) (No. 75-1069).
220. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, supra note 15.
221. Turner v. Dep't of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44 (1975); Sylvara v.
Industrial Comm'n of Colo., - Colo. _-, 550 P.2d 868 (1976).
216.
217.
218.
219.
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impact of an employment practice is a showing of statistical
disparity between the racial and ethnic composition of the
community population or labor force and the composition
of the employer's workforce drawn from the community.
This showing has been held sufficient to create a prima facie
case in Title VII cases. 22 The validity of the statistics may
be questioned to reduce the probative thrust of the data."'
Absent a strong statistical showing, evidence of practices
which discriminate must be included.
The United States Supreme Court in McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green" 5 set forth the proof necessary to establish
a prima facie case in a single-plaintiff action. The plaintiff
may show (i) that he belongs to a protected minority; (ii)
that he applied for and was qualified for a job for which the
employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection,
the position remained open and the employer continued to
seek applications from persons of plaintiff's qualifications.
The Court noted that the facts will necessarily vary in Title
VII cases, and this specification of proof is not necessarily
applicable to differing fact situations.226
In cases concerning discriminatory promotion policies,
the Tenth Circuit has recently held that upon the plaintiff's
showing of his general qualifications for the job, the defendant's failure to promote a protected group into the job
over a lengthy period of time, and utilization of a subjective
promotion policy, the plaintiff is entitled to an inference
of discrimination which shifts the burden to the defendant
to show business necessity for the failure to promote.2
222. United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971); Reed
v. Arlington Hotel Co., 476 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1973); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., supra note 83; Chance v. Bd. of Examiners, 458 F.2d
1167 (2d Cir. 1972).
223. Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 468 (D. Colo. 1973), rev'd
on other grounds, 524 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1975); Chicano Police Officers'
Ass'n v. Stover, 526 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1975).
224. Waters v. Wisconsin Steelworks of Intl Harvester Co., supra note 197;
Bridgeport Guardians v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, supra note 170.
225. Supra note 63.
226. See also King v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 523 F.2d 879 (8th Cir. 1975);
Gates v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 492 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1974).
227. Muller v. United States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923 (10th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., supra note 90.
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The plaintiff is required to prove his or her case by a
preponderance of the evidence." 8 The whole of the evidence is considered; therefore incidents which, when viewed
separately may not show bias, may show a pattern of discrimination when considered together." '
The Wyoming Supreme Court, in Shenajield v. Sheridan
County School DistrictNo. 1,230 has indicated that the burden
on the plaintiff may be very heavy, for the court will give
deference to the employer's freedom of choice where the
existence of discrimination is difficult to ascertain. Mary
Shenafield applied for a teaching position with the defendant, having seen an advertisement for a job teaching English, Spanish and drama. She had a degree in English and
was certified to teach English and speech. When she applied,
the principal told her a male was preferred because there
were few men on the faculty. The male who was later hired
for the position was described as having good recommendations but no experience other than student teaching. The
plaintiff filed a complaint with the FEC and at the ensuing
hearing the testimony of the school board was that she was
not hired because she would have to commute, the position
now involved coaching sports, she required a higher salary
due to her qualifications, the principal found her "pushy and
demanding" and thought she would not stay long because
he believed she had made several moves due to her husband's
employment. These factors had not been discussed previously
with the plaintiff to allow her a chance to respond. The
Supreme Court affirmed the district court's reversal of the
FEC finding of sex discrimination for lack of substantial
supporting evidence of discrimination. The court stated the
FEC had erroneously assumed that an employer must pick
the candidate with the most qualifications and experience.
The employer was held to have a freedom of choice of selection
of employees in light of its own special problems and the fact
that the job advertisement did not state coaching was involved did not mean the employer lost its discretion in hiring.
228. Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir 1975); Frockt v. Olin
Corp., 344 F. Supp. 369 (D. Ind 1972).
229. Lowry v. Whitaker Cable Corp., supra note 182.
230. 544 P.2d 870 (Wyo. 1976).
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The case is interesting as it represents one of the most difficult types of discrimination for a plaintiff to prove, and the
court fails to deal with the preference for one sex over the
other. The court did not discuss the preference for a male
either as lawful affirmative action or unlawful bias. Nor did
it discuss the addition of coaching duties as an afterthought
which may have been used to justify hiring a male, or the
assumption that she could not coach or another person on the
faculty could not assist in the coaching duties. The statements of the school board seem to indicate that a stereotype
of women dictates how they are to be evaluated. The real
question the case raises is whether the court will continue to
disregard indications of discrimination and place the emphasis on the employer's freedom of choice.
DEFENSES

Business Necessity
The primary defense in Title VII cases is the doctrine
of business necessity which originated in Griggs. Under this
doctrine the employer has the burden of establishing that the
practices in question are necessary to the business even
though they may have a discriminatory effect. Strict standards have been applied to a showing of business necessity,
and mere proof that the practices serve legitimate management functions is insufficient. The test is whether the employment practice is essential to the safe and efficient operation of the business and acceptable policies and alternatives
are not available. 3 ' For example, in sex discrimination cases,
to meet the business necessity test, the employer would have
to show the essence of the business would be undermined by
not treating applicants and employees differently on the
basis of sex.2"2
Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
Title VII provides that religious, sex or national origin
discrimination may be justified where "religion, sex or na231. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., supra note 191.
232. Diaz v. Pan American Airways, Inc., supra note 141.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol12/iss2/4

42

Lawson: Employment Discrimination in Wyoming: A New Legal Frontier

1977

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

529

tional origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular en'
terprise."233
The regulations further state that sex will be
considered a bona fide occupational qualification only where
necessary for authenticity or genuineness.234 This defense
has most often been asserted in cases of sex discrimination
and with little success. The standard which is generally
applicable and which must be met in order to establish a valid
bona fide occupational qualification is whether all or substantially all women do not have the capability of doing the
job.235 An individual standard which requires that each individual be given reasonable opportunity to demonstrate his 2or
3her abilities was applied in Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,
which found failure to place women in certain jobs on the
basis of a weight lifting restriction of 35 pounds for women
to be unlawful." '
Reliance on State Protective Legislation
One source of differential treatment of men and women
in employment is state labor laws. Although the state laws
may have been intended as protective legislation for women,
those that exclude women from certain types of employment
are preempted by Title VII and are not considered a defense.2 "38 The courts have nevertheless exercised their discretion to refuse backpay awards in some Title VII cases
where the employer has shown reliance in good faith on state
protective laws.2"9 Opinions vary on whether the provisions
of state laws which require certain differential benefits for
women must be extended to men, or whether the statute is
invalid and benefits do not have to be provided to men or
women." ' The EEOC regulations advocate extension of bene233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1970)
29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (19751.
Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., eupra note 148.
Supra note 66.
See Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Ry. Co., 293 F. Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1968),
rev'd on other grounds, 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971).
238. 20 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (1975); General Elec. Co. v. Hughes, 454 F.2d 730 (6th
Cir. 1972); Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac Ry.Co., supra note 237; Richards v.
Griffith Rubber Mills, 300 F. Supp. 338 (D. Ore. 1969).
239. E.g., Williams v. General Foods Corp., 492 F.2d 399 (7th Cir. 1974); LeBlanc v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 460 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1972).
240. See, e.g., Potlatch Forests, Inc. v. Hays, 318 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Ark.
1970); Homemakers, Inc. of Los Angeles v. Division of Indus. Welfare,
356 F. Supp. 1111 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
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fits to men except where the employer can prove that business
necessity prevents such an extension, in which case the benefits should not be extended to either men or women.24 '
The first case decided under the FEPA, Longacre v.
State,.2 dealt specifically with a state protective law. Longacre was charged with a violation of a statute which prohibited employing women as bartenders."' The defenses
raised were that the law was unconstitutional and had been
repealed by the passage of the FEPA. The Wyoming Supreme Court found the two statutes so repugnant they could
not stand together and the earlier restrictive statute therefore implicitly repealed, never reaching the constitutional
issue.
A recent decision by the Albany County District Court
reaches a different conclusion than the EEOC on the extension of benefits provided to women by protective legislation.
In Asamera Oil, Inc. v. Wyoming Department of Labor and
Statistics,... two male employees filed complaints that the
company was not paying them the same overtime as that required for females under the Wyoming statutes requiring
overtime pay for women. The Wyoming Commissioner of
Labor had determined that the benefits of the statute should
be extended to men and failure to do so constituted sex discrimination. The district court disagreed, finding the statute rendered void and unenforceable by both the FEPA and
Title VII. The Court also emphasized that the Commissioner
had far exceeded his delegated powers by attempting to create
a general right to premium overtime which the legislature
did not intend to create.
The Wyoming Constitution provision that boys under
fourteen years of age and girls or women are not to be employed in or about, coal, iron, or other dangerous mines, unless they are doing clerical work, is another example of a conflict with the prohibitions of the FEPA and Title VII 2 4
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

29 C.F.R. § 1604. 2(b)(3), (4) (1975).
448 P.2d 832 (Wyo. 1968).
WYO. STAT. § 12-20 (Supp. 1975).
No. 16,665 (Wyo. Dist. Ct., 2d Dist., Aug. 19, 1976)
WYO. CONST. art. 9, § 3.
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With increased mining activity being carried on in Wyoming,
the issue could eventually be raised. The conflict may soon
be resolved, however, by repeal of the constitutional provision, the 1977 Wyoming Legislature having recently passed
a joint house resolution to place the issue of repeal before
the voters.
REMEDIES

Back Pay
Title VII authorizes an award of back pay where the
Court finds such relief to be appropriate.2 4 Back pay is an
integral part of the statutory equitable remedy and is therefore determined by the court, not a jury."" Since the broad
purpose of Title VII is to eliminate discrimination and make
persons whole for injuries resulting from discrimination,
back pay may be denied only for reasons that would not
frustrate the statutory purposes.2 8 A claim for back pay
can be raised as late as the post-trial stage of litigation due
to objectives of Title VII and the nature of the remedy."'9
However, a substantial unwarranted delay in making the
claim may be reason to deny the award. 5 "
Back pay may be awarded in class actions."' Only one
plaintiff need file a charge, as the back pay award to other
members of the class is not predicated on their fulfillment of
the Title VII procedural requirements for filing a suit."
Title VII limits recovery of back pay to a date of no
earlier than two years prior to the filing of a charge of discrimination with the EEOC.5 In computing the back pay
245a.

Enrolled Joint Resolution No. 2 (H. of Rep.), 44th Wyo. State Legislature
(1977).

246. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970).

247. E.g., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, supra note 86.
248. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, aupra note 161; Robinson v. Lorillard
Corp., supra note 75.
249. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., supra note 75; United States v. Hayes Int'l
Corp., supra note 179.
250. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, supra note 161.
251. Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., supra note 90.
252. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, supra note 161; Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive
Co., supra note 66.
253. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970).
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award, courts subtract interim earnings or amounts which
could have been earned with reasonable diligence by those
discriminated against from the total allowable award, as
back pay awards are limited to losses actually suffered."'
In order to compensate for the total loss, future loss of earnings resulting from the discriminatory practices may also be
included." The difficulty of computing back pay and the
unmanageability of awarding it is not a defense, and the
court may consider appointing a master to handle the back
pay award.25
The FEPA specifically authorizes the FEC to reinstate
or upgrade employees, with or without back pay. 5 ' Back pay
has been awarded by the FEC in at least three cases. 8 The
district court in reviewing one of the cases noted that the
FEC had exceeded its authority in awarding back pay, before
reversing the entire decision for lack of jurisdiction.5 9 The
court did not state the reasons for finding that the FEC
exceeded its authority in awarding back pay, but it might be
speculated that the case involved failure to hire rather than
reinstatement or upgrading, and the court narrowly interpreted the remedies provision. The cases indicate the back
pay, when awarded, is computed in the same manner as in
Title VII cases. The FEPA, however, does not contain a limit
on the amount of time prior to filing the charge which can
be considered. The FEC denied backpay in the Kaufholz case
without giving reasons for the denial. 6 °
Injunctive Relief
Injunctive relief enjoining the discriminatory practices
of the defendant is the most common form of relief sought in
254. Jurinok v. Wiegand Co., 477 F.2d 1038 (3rd Cir. 1973), aff'g 331 F. Supp.
1184 (W.D. Pa. 1971); McLaughlin v. Mercury Freight Lines, Inc., 4'72
F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'g 5 Fair Empl. Prac .Cas. 769 (S.D. Ala.
1972) ; Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., supra note 94.
255. Johnson v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 895
(W.D.N.C. 1975).
256. United States v. United States Steel Corp., supra note 91.
257. Wyo. STAT. § 27-262(7) (1967).
258. Banyai v. Salt Creek Freightways, supra note 209; Pfister v. Niobrara
County, supra note 143; Shanafield v. Sheridan County School Dist. No. 1,
supra note 230.
259. Pfister v. Niobrara County, supra note 143.
260. Kaufholz v. Cheyenne Fire Dep't., supra note 183.
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Title VII cases. Preliminary relief, as previously discussed,
may be sought where prompt judicial action is necessary to
carry out the purposes of the Act.
Perhaps one of the greatest drawbacks of the FEPA is
the failure to provide for preliminary injunctive relief. The
FEPA does, however, provide for injunctive relief in the
form of cease-and-desist orders upon a finding of discrimination.
Affirmative Relief
The most controversial and yet most effective forms of
relief are the affirmative hiring ratios and minority preferences ordered by the courts to remedy the effects of past
discrimination. Although Title VII counsels against preferential treatment, 61 this provision has consistently been interpreted not to preclude this affirmative relief. 2 '
Affirmative relief is discretionary in nature; however,
the affirmative relief ordered under Title VII has been extensive. Upon finding of past discrimination, the courts have
ordered affirmative relief such as union job referrals or employee hiring on an alternate black-white, one-for-one basis." '
Courts may refuse to grant such relief where the showing of
past discrimination is insubstantial.
Affirmative action is specifically provided for in the
FEPA and has been ordered by the FEC in some cases." 4
This affirmative action has included requiring the posting
of notices, 6 ' reporting, 6 reinstatement and provision of
261. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970); Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters
Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Ironworkers
Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971).
262. United States v. Local 38, IBEW, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 943 (1970); Local 189, United Paperworkers & Papermakers v.
United States, supra note 191.
263. E.g., Local 53, Int'l Ass'n of Heat & Frost Workers v. Vogler 407 F.2d 1047
(5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Central Motor Lines, Inc., 325 F. Supp.
478 (W.D.N.C. 1970). Cases illustrating other examples of affirmative
relief are: United States v. Local 212, IBEW, 472 F.2d 634 (6th Cir.
1973); Southern Illinois Builders' Ass'n v. Ogilvic, 471 F.2d 680 (7th Cir.
1972).
264. Banyai v. Salt Creek Freightways, supra note 209.
265. Id.
266. Kaufholz v. Cheyenne Fire Dep't, supra note 183.
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proper training and equipment, as well as separate sleeping
quarters and bathrooms for women and men. 67 The FEC
has issued Affirmative Action Program Guidelines to assist
employers concerned with eliminating the effects of discrimination in designing affirmative action programs and establishing goals and timetables.
Whether the affirmative action is taken pursuant to a
court order, an executive order, or the concern of employers
that charges of discrimination will be filed against them,
the action may result in charges of "reverse discrimination"
or discrimination against whites. 6 Where the charge resulted from preferential hiring quotas designed to remedy
past exclusion of protected groups, the courts have found
the affirmative action necessary to eradicate discrimination.2" This does not mean, however, that an absolute preference be given to minorities, particularly when they are not
qualified for the job. Affirmative action should mean instead that when applicants for employment or candidates for
promotion are equally qualified, a preference should be given
to a member of a group previously excluded by discriminatory
practices as is necessary to achieve a reasonable ratio of
males , females, minorities and non-minorities in the workforce."'0 The use of quotas has been limited in several cases
to those situations where (1) there has been a clear cut
pattern of long continued and egregious discrimination, and
(2) the effect of reverse discrimination is not felt by2 or
concentrated on an identifiable group of non-minorities. 11
Other Types of Relief
As a general rule, punitive and compensatory damages
are not awardable under Title VII. Title VII provides for
awards of equitable relief which the court may deem appropriate, but the majority of the courts have held that punitive
267. Id.
268. McDonald v. Santa Fe Transp. Co., supra note 23.
269. Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, supra note 261; United
States v. Ironworkers Local 86, supra note 261.
270. United States v. N.L. Industries, Inc., aupra note 187; Carter v. Gallagher,
supra note 153.
271. EEOC v. Local 638, Sheet Metal Workers, 532 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1976);
Kirkland v. N.Y. State Dep't of Correctional Serv., supra note 167.
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damages were not intended to be a part of such relief. 72
Compensatory damages have also been found beyond the scope
of the intended relief, although some courts have found such
awards compensation for tangible economic losses.273
The FEPA does not provide for punitive and compensatory damages and no decisions have dealt with the issue.
CONCLUSION

Equal employment law in Wyoming is a new frontier,
yet to be explored as so few cases have been brought in Wyoming. An excellent opportunity exists to shape this new body
of law to both protect the individual from discrimination and
take into account the management problems of the employer.
A number of statutory changes should be made to provide a better basis from which to work. The FEPA should be
amended to include a prohibition against retaliation by an
employer against any person who has asserted rights under
the law. The threat of losing one's job or getting unfavorable
references is very real and prevents aggrieved persons from
seeking relief. A statute of limitations on the filing of complaints with the FEC is critical. Currently a person could
complain of an incident which occurred four or five years
ago, for example, and the necessary investigation would be
very limited because records had been destroyed and witnesses could not be located. A burden is also placed on the
employer to produce relevant documents that may be stored
away to construct a possible defense. A provision for the
award of attorney's fees should also be added to the FEPA;
otherwise a plaintiff without sufficient funds to hire an attorney has no real means of enforcing his rights under the
FEPA beyond filing a charge. Also, under existing law, an
272. EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., supra note 122; Jiron v. Sperry Rand Corp.,
supra note 86; Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 368 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Cal.
1973). But see Dessenberg v. American Metal Forming Co., 8 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 290 (D.C. Ohio 1973).
273. Humphrey v. Southwestern Portland Cement Co., 369 F. Supp. 832 (W.D.
Tex. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 488 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1974) ; Tooles v.
Kellogg, 336 F. Supp. 14 (D. Nebr. 1972) ; Jiron v. Sperry Rand Corp., supra
note 86; Waters v. Heublin, Inc., 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 908 (N.D. Cal.
1974).
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employer who prevails cannot be compensated for the expense
incurred to hire an attorney to defend against a baseless
complaint.
The failure of the Wyoming legislature to repeal or
extend to men the benefits of protective labor legislation expressly applicable only to women leaves the employer in a
confusing position. Until such action is taken, the employer
is subject to conflicting legislation, and compliance with the
state law is not a defense to Title VII claims.
The advice an attorney provides the employer is an
important factor in making the laws more beneficial. A
negative attitude toward government regulation of free enterprise, particularly with regard to employment, is prevalent. A negative attitude cannot negate the laws, however,
and the situation will be improved only by increasing awareness by employers of the requirements of the laws. They
must realize these laws do not require hiring of unqualified
persons. Moreover, the laws do not require retention of employees who are not satisfactorily performing their job because the are of a racial or ethnic minority or female. Failure
to terminate such employees often builds the very kind of
prejudice the laws are designed to eradicate and subjects the
employer to charges of reverse discrimination. The FEC and
the EEOC both provide materials and training on equal employment law and should be consulted for assistance in bringing an employer's employment practices into compliance.
The real question at this point is what the courts in
Wyoming, both state and federal, will do to shape the law.
Uncertainty is increased by recent indications of the Wyoming Supreme Court that types of discrimination which are
difficult to prove may be disregarded. Until further decisions develop the trend of Wyoming law, the general case
law based on Title VII is the only comprehensive source of
equal employment law in Wyoming.
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